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LEGAL ETHICS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS, NEW CHALLENGES, AND OLD VALUES

REAL

t
SANFORD M. STEIN. & JAN M. GEHT

In 1991, Solano County Deputy District Attorney Mark Pollack
filed criminal charges against the 16-lawyer San Francisco firm of
Sulllivan, Roche & Johnson and associate William Scherer, alleging that
they encouraged a client to illegally abandon hazardous waste at its
vacated headquarters.' Although a municipal court judge dismissed those
2
and other subsequently filed charges against the defendants, the debate
about legal ethical obligations of environmental practitioners rages on.
The controversy stems from the recognition that environmental lawyers,
unlike their brethren in tax and banking, may actually identify with the
agenda of the activist public regulators and thus face a moral crisis in
Some
choosing between their clients' and society's interests.
commentators view the predicament that environmental lawyers face as an
"either/or" dilemma-either act as a "hired gun" for a client who dumps
hazardous waste upstream from an orphanage's playground or try saving
the children by actually blowing the whistle on your client to the
appropriate authorities. Such polarization, however, while providing
fertile ground for academic speculation (and it does seem that most of
these commentators belong to the academia), offers little guidance to
practitioners who confront real world problems. A more balanced
approach, however, recognizes that the interests of the client and the
Mr. Stein is a partner with Wildnan, Harrold, Allen & Dixon in Chicago, IL.
Mr. Geht is a student at the University of Michigan Law School.
1
Don J. DeBenedictis, Advice is Legal: Pollution ChargesDismissed Against Law Firm,
associate,77 A.B.A. J. 17 (Oct. 1991).
2 Marianne LaVelle, Judge Drops ChargesAgainst S.F. Law Firm, NAT'L L. J. (Apr. 6,
1992).
3 See David Dana, Symposium: Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients:
EnvironmentalLawyers and the Public Service Model of Lawyering, 74 OR. L. REV. 57,
67-68 (1995).
As far as I know, aspiring tax lawyers do not generally have greater
sympathy for the Internal Revenue Service than for taxpayers. Nor is
there any reason to believe that aspiring banking lawyers are much
more sympathetic to the positions of the banking agencies that they are
to those of any banks.
Id.
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public do not necessarily conflict and that a conscientious lawyer can
reach the optimal solution without compromising his/her loyalty to either.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL-PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT VS.
PROTECTING ONE'S FINANCIAL WELL BEING

The traditional discussion of ethical dilemmas follows familiar
paths. The academic commentators lament the lack of ethical standards as
though ethical quandaries can be reduced to a simple computer logarithm.
They lament their perceived "sell-out" of environmental lawyers as though
the responsibility of the latter somehow differs from the responsibility of
the rest of the profession to provide a vigorous defense to their clients.
Finally, they demonize the "hired guns" without ever addressing the
benefits that the society gains from the under-enforcement of draconian
environmental regulations.
The practitioners respond to all these
criticisms by noting that the integrity of the judicial system rests on the
zealous advocacy skills of each side.
A.

If A, then B; ifB, then C ...

Long before the institution of lawyers began its existence, the
question of "right" and "wrong" has fascinated most philosophers. Unable
to resolve every conflict, the philosophers resorted to simple guidelines
defining the extremes while leaving gray areas up to individual
interpretation. Certain religious movements have attempted to codify
rules of behavior in every imaginable setting (e.g., Talmud in Judaism),
but the resulting tomes have proven to be too cumbersome and, some
would argue, unable to address societal changes. The legal profession
chose the philosophical approach of relying on the judgment of its
members when it adopted the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct or its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 4 As the following examples illustrate, while such
guidance leaves many questions unanswered, it does provide sufficient
framework for an attorney to choose the proper course of action.
1.

Conflict of Interest in Superfund Litigation

J. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes
of Professional
Responsibility, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 825, 835 (1994).
4See
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Litigation under Comrehensive Environmental Response,
6
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund") presents
the clearest illustration of the limitations that any codified system of legal
ethics would have. Many law firms have long abandoned the principle
that "no man can serve two masters" in pursuit of the possibility of
multiple successes, the praise of the legal community, enhanced reputation
for the firm, and an expanded client list. 7 These firms sometimes forget
that a continued representation of parties despite the existence of a conflict
of interest can seriously injure a firm's reputation and possibly result in
monetary damages and disciplinary action against the attorneys and the
firm. 8 The complexity and size of a typical environmental proceeding
combined with a relatively small number of qualified firms increases the
likelihood of a conflict of interest. 9 Because under CERCLA, any person
who has contributed to the disposal of hazardous substances can be held
responsible, the number of potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") can
reach well into the hundreds.' 0 The greater number of PRPs increases the
likelihood that a single firm would represent several parties." Although
certain natural groupings of parties in Superfund litigation may benefit
from multiple representation and survive potential conflicts because of the
continuing relationship between them, practitioners should be wary of a
12
potential conflict of interest in all other cases.
Model Rule 1.7(a) provides that no lawyer shall engage in multiple
representations of clients whose interests will directly conflict, unless he
or she reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely
13 While Rule
affected, and each client consents to the representation.
1.7(a) applies to "definite" conflicts, a milder Rule 1.7(b) applies to
potential conflicts. Rule 1.7(b) bars the representation of the client only if
the representation will be "materially limited" by the lawyer's outside
interests or responsibilities. 14 Rule 1.7 clarifies the requirements needed
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
6 Patrick E. Donovan, Comment, Serving Multiple Masters: Confronting the Conflicting

Interests that Arise in Superfund Disputes, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 372 (1990).
7 Id. at 372.
8 Id. at 371.
9 Id. at 372.

10 Id.at 373.
11Id.

12 Donovan,

supra note 6.

13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001).

14

Id. at R. 1.7(b).
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to conduct multiple representations under Canon 5 of the Model Code and
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and (C) by dictating that the client's informed
consent must be independent of the lawyer's reasonable belief that the
representation will not be adversely affected.15 Unfortunately, the Model
Rules do not explain when it is "reasonable" for an attorney to believe that
a multiple representation is permissible.' 6 Nor do they provide guidance
in determining when a multiple representation becomes "adversely
affected" aside from the observation in the comments to Rule 1.7 that
adverse effect occurs "when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." 17 Finally, guidance on what
constitutes a "fully informed consent" is limited to advising one's client to
consult a separate counsel before consenting. 18 While Rule 1.7 addresses
representation of multiple current clients, Rule 1.9 deals with
representation that has an adverse impact on a former client.' 9
It
prohibits the representation of a client who has a materially adverse
interest with a former client in the same or substantially related matter
unless the former client consents. 20 The comments to the Rule, however,
allow the representation of a new client with adverse interests in a similar
matter so long as the representation involves a wholly distinct problem. 2 1
The vagueness and multiplicity of these rules poses substantial
hazards for any law firm engaged in CERCLA litigation. The standards of
liability established in section 107 of CERCLA and the application ofjoint
and several liability not only discourage attempts at common defense but
also encourage cross-claims between the defendants designed to limit
individual liability. 22 Given the potential magnitude of joint and several
liability, parties invariably argue for apportionment. 23
However,
transporters and de minimis generators protest such methodology and
argue that the large-volume generators and generators of different
hazardous substances should bear most of the burden. 24 The EPA's
15

Donovan, supra note 6, at 375.

Id.
17 Id. at 376.
18 Id.
19 Id.
16

20 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2001).
21 Id.at R. 1.9 cmt.
22 Donovan, supra note 6, at 381.
23

Id.at 387.

24 Id.
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settlement procedures further intensify the adversity through the threat of
disproportionate share of clean-up costs for non-settling litigants. 25 More
specifically, the agency refuses to release vital volumetric data until after
PRPs have answered informational requests. 26 Moreover, PRPs have a
short timeframe in which to decide whether to negotiate with the
government. 27 Finally, the use of contribution protection, non-binding
allocations of responsibility ("NBARs"), de minimis contribution
settlements, and mixed funding polarizes PRPs, particularly if a relatively
small group of PRPs refuses to agree to a settlement proposal.28 CERCLA
protects settled PRPs both by allowing them to seek contribution from
other PRPs and by not allowing other PRPs to seek contribution from
them. 29 EPA utilizes NBARs as an optional tool to establish preliminary
guidelines for allocation. 30 While NBARs can help a PRP class by
providing an objective analysis of the situation, an attorney representing
of his clients disagrees with
multiple clients may face an obstacle if3one
1
responsibility.
of
the proposed allocation
Such conflicts can be avoided when a group of PRPs share similar
interests and obligations, as in the case of PRPs that operate in the same
community and may feel mutually obligated to contribute to clean-up
efforts to maintain their status and relationship with that community.
The existence of a mutually beneficial business relationship may also
entice parties to present a common defense to ensure the continuation of
the relationship. 3 Aside from these natural groupings, the practitioner in
a multiple representation should carefully consider not only the potential
for current conflict, but the possibility of a future conflict as each PRP
seeks to minimize its own liability through either settlement or litigation.
Attorney Fees in Citizen Suit Settlements

2.

25

Id.

26 Id.at 384.

Id.
28 Donovan, supra note 6, at 388.
29 Id.at 390.
30 Id.at 391.
31 Id.at 391.
32 Id.at 394.
27

33 Id.
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The modem day citizen suit originated in the common law qui tam
action.34 "The qui tam action is a traditional remedy by which a citizen
can bring a law suit 'in the name of the king,' particularly where the
citizen has a direct personal stake in the prosecution." 35 A citizen suit puts
the plaintiffs attorneys in an unenviable position of being between the
proverbial "rock and a hard place" in settlement negotiations. 36 Because
in these cases attorneys rarely have paying clients, they must recover their
fees from the settlement proceedings through statutory fee-shifting
provisions.37 However, corporate defendants prefer to reformulate their
products or provide warnings rather than pay the attorney's costs and fees.
38
The issue of civil penalties closely relates to the fee problem.
Since penalties are not tax deductible and generate negative
public opinion, a company may condition a settlement upon
the absence of civil penalties. If large attorney's fees are
part of the bargain, an attorney may be tempted to jump at
the offer, without considering the role that the penalties
play in (1) funding toxic cleanups, (2) enabling future
enforcement efforts and (3) deterring future violations.
Although this practice ensures the attorney sizable fees, it
clearly leaves the government out of the loop by avoiding
the seventy-five percent statutory diversion of those
penalties, which in turn circumvents the public's interest in
easing its tax burden and shifting the cost of hazardous
39
cleanups onto polluters.
Attorneys, however, defend their high fees by noting that they
bring cases that the government passes on and that they win thereby
forcing entire industries to change behavior.4 ° Observers further argue

A. Ross, Comment, Citizen Suits: California'sProposition65 and the Lawyer's
EthicalDuty to the Public Interest,29 U.S.F.L. REv. 809, 810 n.4 (1995).
35 Id. (citing ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 324 (1992)).
Id.at 815.
37See, e.g., The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
11001-50 (2001).
38 Ross, supra note 34, at 815.
39
Id. at 815-16.
34Julie

40

Id
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the public-interest attorneys will be unwilling to
that without high 4fees,
1
bring citizen suits.
Another method of circumventing the U.S. Treasury involves the
use of "environmentally beneficial expenditures" ("EBE") in pre-trial
consent decrees. 42 At least in theory, EBEs deter future violations because
the defendant must pay a large monetary fine.4 3 Furthermore, the
environmental groups use the funds to clean up the specific violations that
the offender caused instead of the funds oing to the general pool of
finances used by the federal government. 4 While the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") has consistently opposed the use of EBEs
in Clean Water Act settlements because "they typically supplant the
payment of civil penalties to the United States Treasury," the courts have
split on whether to follow DOJ's lead and reject EBEs or to allow them,
provided they have a sufficient nexus to the purposes of the particular
lawsuit and the overall legislative intent of the statute being enforced. 45
Whereas one can at least understand the opposition to high fees as an
alternative to civil penalties, the opposition to EBEs is puzzling since the
money is not diverted for private use but is instead used to clean up the
environment. It would seem that the opposition to EBEs stems from the
long-standing belief of some government bureaucrats that only they can
solve environmental problems. The idea that environmental groups may
be more efficient not only bewilders these regulators but also threatens
their substantial enforcement obligations. Environmental activists would
suggest that, rather than opposing citizen suits, federal and state
governments should welcome the help that they receive from highly
qualified attorneys and dedicated environmental groups. Their singleminded dedication, however, is itself subject to criticism as being "agenda
driven," rather than purely support of public policies.
Conflicts of Consciencefor EnvironmentalPractitioners

B.

As the prior section illustrated, the environmental practitioners
often face real ethical conflicts. These problems, however, should not
diminish the opposition to the zealous tone of the environmental
movement. While the debates about environmental issues have never
4 1 1Id

.

42 Id. at

820.

43 Id. at 820-21.
44Ross, supra note 34, at 820-21.
45 Id. at 821-22.
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lacked self-righteous rhetoric, one of the commentators has really pushed
the envelope by proposing a new environmental lawyer's creed that stated:
As a member of the learned profession of law and as a
member of the practicing bar in the area of environmental
law, I promise to:
Pledge allegiance to the Earth and to the Life it
sustains.
Always strive to act in the manner, which most
benefits the Earth, its biosphere, its inhabitants, and its
natural resources.
Stay informed about issues, problems, and solutions
concerning the environment.
Do my part to educate others, in particular my
clients, about issues and problems concerning the
environment and about all of the environmental
consequences of their proposed actions, including the
effects to low-income and non-white communities.
Include all interested or affected parties in
environmental transactions in which I am involved so that
the interests of all are considered before final actions are
taken.
Propose and encourage methods and technologies
that prevent pollution and minimize waste production.46
Although some of these promises have merit, others put the
attorney in a direct conflict between their clients and "the Earth." a Most
environment-friendly lawyers do not go as far as the author of this pledge
does. They do, however, all feel that their ethical obligations to the
society exceed those of any other legal professionals. Such sentiments
have certain merits.
Consider for example the question of attorney-client privilege.
Extreme restrictions placed on a lawyer's ability to disclose information
relating to the representation of a client, regardless of the social

Olga L. Moya, Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y
215, 266 (1996).
47In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court ruled that Sierra
Club lacked standing to
pursue a claim against the federal Forest Service's development of national forest into a
ski resort. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972). Apparently, the Court did not view either "the
Earth" or "Nature" as a party capable of asserting standing in judicial proceedings. Id.
46
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consequences of nondisclosure, represent the most controversial aspect of
legal ethics. 48 Model Rule 1.6 provides:
(a)

(b)

A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1)
to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2)
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.49

The narrowness of this rule led commentators to wonder about the
duty that lawyers have to report criminal plans in cases where the victims
will not otherwise be warned in time and about the duty to report criminal
conduct likely to result in deaths that are not "imminent." 50 Model Rules
create severe "moral" conflicts for practitioners. What should an attorney
do when confronted with a client who dumped hazardous waste in a
surface impoundment but did not tell the prospective buyer about it even
when questioned directly? 51 Clearly the attorney has no knowledge of
whether the dumping would cause imminent death or substantial bodily
harm and thus Rule 1.6 would preclude any disclosure.52 What if the
48

Douglas R. Williams, Loyalty, Independence and Social Responsibility in the Practice

of EnvironmentalLaw, 44 ST. Louis L. J. 1061, 1073 (2000).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6
(2001).
50 Williams, supra note 48, at 1074-75.
51
1d. at 1076.
52

Id.
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attorney hires an expert who confirms that the hazardous waste is
extremely toxic but the client refuses to even hear the results? ABA
Formal Opinion 92-366 explicitly concludes that a lawyer may not reveal
a client's fraud.5 3 A conscientious lawyer does have a way out-Formal
Opinion 92-366 does allow for the possibility of a "noisy" withdrawal that
would communicate to a prospective buyer that something is wrong. 54 To
add the last wrinkle, what if the deal closes and the buyer announces plans
to build a residential project with the aquifer under the property supplying
the drinking water? Rule 1.6 appears to prohibit disclosure since it allows
exceptions only for "prospective conduct" by the client, not to a client's
past criminal acts. 55 Because the sale has been completed, the client's
involvement would end and would thus constitute a completed, past
criminal conduct. Amusingly, the attorney will be allowed to disclose
privileged
information if after the withdrawal the client refuses to pay the
56
bill.
The impact of an environmental disaster, such as the Three Mile
Island nuclear accident, on society far outweighs the risk of a tax evader or
even a serial murderer. However, regardless of how appealing the desire
of some lawyers to put the interests of the public ahead of their clients'
might be, they still must ask themselves whether they can plausibly argue
that the strength of their legal advocacy should ever turn on the moral
culpability of their client and the magnitude of the violation itself. An
environmental lawyer might be appalled at his client's omitting of
pollutants into the air, but his distaste cannot possibly rival that of the
lawyer called upon to defend John Wayne Gacy or other heinous
criminals. Thus, our society has made a conscious decision to separate the
roles of prosecutors and defenders. It set up a system in which a client can
ask his lawyer for advice without any fear of that information being
released to anyone else. Allowing lawyers to subordinate their clients'
interests to their own ideological beliefs would discourage clients from
ever seeking advice and preclude any environmentally-conscious legal
practitioner from influencing the decision-making process.
This,
arguably, would result in even more environmental violations and worse,
destroy the essential advocacy that supports our system of jurisprudence.
Protecting the environment is a worthy goal but it cannot be achieved
through the breach of a fiduciary duty. It can only be achieved by
53ABA

Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).

54 Id.
55MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 12 (2001).
56

See id. at R. 1.6(b)(2).
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educating clients and the public. The lawyers themselves can serve as
educators but their 'ability to influence will turn on the degree of trust that
exists between them and their clients. And this trust cannot be maintained
when the client lacks confidence in his lawyer's loyalty.
C.

Can EnvironmentalRegulations Be Bad-Growth v. Preservation?

To reflect the general tone of the discussion about legal ethics,
previous sections have taken for granted the wisdom of environmental
regulations and compliance therewith. In reality, the support for such
regulations and underlying theories has been less than uniform. For
57
instance, scientists have openly questioned global warming theory.
Also, President Bush recently criticized 58
the Kyoto agreement and stated
that the United States will not abide by it.
Nowhere is the split more divisive than in the ongoing debate
about the proper balance between growth versus preservation. The early
industrialists advocated growth at all cost and this ensured the economic
dominance of this country. Of course, without proper enforcement of
property rights they also polluted air, water, and land. Such outrageous
conduct eventually led the early environmentalists to advocate
preservation at all cost. The society, stuck between these two seemingly
irreconcilable positions, attempted to chart a middle path thereby drawing
criticism from both sides of the debate.
Neither the early
environmentalists' utter refusal to recognize that the society needs to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis for judging industrial projects, nor the
industrialists' inability to incorporate long-term consequences of those
projects into the analysis, helped matters.
The real political battle began in the 1960s with the expansion of
national parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas when Congress
passed the Wilderness Act of 1964, 59 the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act of 1964, 60 the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,616 the
Robert R. Britt, The Greenhouse Effect and Global Warming, available at
http://explorezone.com/weather/globalwarm.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
58 Robert N. Stavins, President Bush's Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol Provides
57

Opportunity for Meaningful Action, Policy Matters 01-11 (Apr. 2001), available at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/policy/policy_01_11 .asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2002).
59 Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-36

2000)).

Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. §§ 14601-04, et seq. (2000)).
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Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968,62 and the National Trails System Act
of 1968.63 These, combined with the Endangered Species Act 4 and the
Delaney Amendment to the Food and Drug Act,65 assigned paramount
value to the goal of preservation. 66 Responding to a number of pesticide
abuses, contaminated lakes and rivers, and smog-filled skies, Congress
enacted the next flurry of legislation in the 1970s. 67 By the end of the
decade, it had added amendments to the Clean Air Act, 68 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,69 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act. 70 Congress also passed the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 7 1 the Toxic Substances Control Act, 72 and the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. 73 Not satisfied with earlier
statutes dealing with the protection of natural resources, the Congress
exploded with ten more statutes in just eight years-National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 74 the Marine Mammal Protection Act

61

Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6

S2000)).

Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1281-87

2000)).
Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-51

2000)).

Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44

2000)).

Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 342 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
66 Futrell, supra note 4, at 827.
67

Id.

68

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
69 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
70 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973
odified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (2000)).
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78
11994 & Supp. V 1999)).
Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71

2000)).

3 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-

86 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
74 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 432170d (1994 & Supp. V. 1999)).
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of 1972, 77 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,76 the Deepwater Port Act
of 1974, 77 the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974,78 the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,80 the National Forest
Management Act of 1976,1 the Soil and Water Resource Conservation
Act of 1977,82 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977.83 Faced with inefficient agencies, Congress further "narrowed
executive branch discretion, transferred key management decisions from
the states to the federal government, expanded citizen and press
information rights, and created citizen-suit provisions to give watchdog
groups a legal basis for monitoring agency implementation of
environmental statutes."84 The environmental plaintiffs of the 1970s also
found a sympathetic reception in the courts, which "relaxed judicial
doctrines-such as standing and scope of review-that could have barred

citizen suits. Further, judges gave an expansive reading to the statutes,
citing congressional intent to safeguard the environment as a 85reason to
issue injunctions against destructive agency development plans."
This plethora of rules and regulations inevitably led to a backlash
by conservatives who argued that environmental laws harmed the
economy. President Reagan tried to reduce the regulations by cutting
86
government agencies and restoring a larger role for the private sector.
75 Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
S2000)).

Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44
2000)) (reformulating the earlier acts of 1966 and 1969).
Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 150124 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
78 Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-87
2000)).
Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (2000)
and 22 U.S.C. 1972-1973 (1988)).
80 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1994
& Supp. V. 1999)).
81 Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. (2000)).
82 Pub. L. No. 95-192, 91 Stat. 1407 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09
2000)).
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994
& Supp. V 1999)).
84 Futrell, supra note 4, at 829.
85
86

Id.
Id. at 830.
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Under President Reagan, James Watt, Secretary of the Department of
Interior, and Ann Gorsuch Burford, Administrator of the EPA, also sought
to reduce regulation, to open up the public lands for more rapid energy
87
development, and to subsidize resource sales of timber and minerals.
Whereas the Congress was able to limit the impact of some of these
initiatives, Ronald Reagan and George Bush appointed sufficient numbers
of conservative judges to the federal bench to ensure that the judiciary
returned to an earlier, more narrow interpretation of the justiciability
doctrine.8 8 The Supreme Court's opinions also reflect a chilly attitude
toward environmental values. 89 Justice Antonin Scalia summed up the
Court's viewpoint in the following passage:
Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant
within this program-failure to revise land use plans in
proper fashion, failure to submit certain recommendations
to Congress, failure to consider multiple use, inordinate
focus upon mineral exploitation, failure to provide required
public notice, failure to provide adequate environmental
impact statements. Perhaps so. But respondent cannot
seek wholesale improvement of this program by court
decree, rather than in the offices of the Department [of the
Interior] or the halls of Congress, where programmatic
improvements are normally made. 90
Realizing this divergence of views between regulatory bodies and
the courts, the industry strengthened its litigation efforts and the
environmental defense bar grew to rival the tax9 1bar in both volume and
intensity of opposition to government regulation.
While the self-serving goals of such litigation cannot be ignored,
the opposition to environmental regulations might actually be about more
than simple self-interest. The critics charge environmental laws as being
ill-advised, ineffective, wasteful, and subversive. 92 The problems with
these laws appear most prominently in two areas: consumer recycling and
the California energy crisis.
87
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Id.
Futrell, supra note 4, at 831.
Id. at 831 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)).

9lId.
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Id. at 832.
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93
Recycling regulations have at least three adverse consequences.
First, since legislators do not personally bear the costs of their decisions,
they react to the fad of the moment and thus the environmental legislation
often "focuses on the trivial and ignores the important." 94 Second, since
legislation often benefits specific companies, "legislative proposals
relating to solid waste automatically create special interest lobbies and
lead to some unholy alliances between people who claim to be
environmentalists and producers of particular products." 95 As a result,
diaper services have lobbied heavily for bans on disposable diapers, paper
interests support the war on plastics, de-inking plants have a vested
interest in mandating the recycling of newsprint, and recycling companies
lobby for laws that would mandate that products contain a minimum
percent of recycled content and would forbid the term "recycled" to
Third, many recycling
describe products made with factory scrap. 96
schemes have an unintended stifling effect on the development of more
cost-efficient programs.97 For instance, whereas most jurisdictions require
household separation recycling programs, Chicago has successfully
implemented a more efficient system in which all recyclables are collected
in a single bag and compacted in traditional garbage trucks. 98 Finally,
legislators often ignore facts to achieve notoriety for being
environmentally friendly. Thus, Maine banned children's aseptic juice
boxes although at the time they constituted "only two-hundredths of one
percent of the nation's landfills," 99 Portland, Oregon and Newark, New
Jersey banned polystyrene food containers although they constituted "only
two-thousandths of one percent of the nation's landfills" 00 and many
states have required newspaper recycling even though "newspapers
constitute only 7 percent of the nation's landfills 0and newspaper recycling
itself has adverse environmental consequences."' '1

Lynn Scarlett, A Consumer's Guide to Environmental Myths and Realities, Reason
Found. Policy Report No. 165 (Sept. 1991), available at http://www.ncpa.org/stud
ies/s165/s165.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
Id.
95 Id.
93
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Id.

97 Id.

Id. Chicago has also instituted a program similar to Pittsburgh's. See City of Chicago,
What Happens to Your Blue Bag, available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/Environme
nt/BlueBag/WhatHppens.htrnl (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
99Scarlett, supra note 93.
100 Id.
101 Id.
98
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Bad energy policy in California resulted in continuous rolling
blackouts and thus illustrates the dangers of extreme environmentalism.
California had the strictest environmental rules in the world, ensuring that
no new dam or plant was built in the last decade. 10 2 Now Californians
fear, and sometimes experience, life without light and air-conditioning.
California serves as a sad, but striking, lesson of the cause and effect of
which critics have been warning.
It shows, step by step, what happens when pie-in-the-sky
environmental policies-initiated by environmental groups,
paid for by armchair environmentalists and pushed through
by ambitious politicians-win out over a reasoned balance
between humans and nature. California's electric demands
have risen 25% over the past eight years, while the supply
of new electricity has risen only 6%.103
The environmental protests that precluded the building of the Auburn
Dam, a hydroelectric facility with immense electrical potential, and the
construction of the Rancho Seco nuclear reactor, account for some of the
discrepancy. Severe air pollution regulations that kept 0 plants
from
4
1
problem.
the
to
contributed
also
have
running at full capacity
Clean air and water are important goals. However, they need not
be accomplished through heavy-handed centralized agencies and
legislatures. "Market environmentalism" provides an approach that
emphasizes the importance
of wealth creation and incentives in
5
environmental protection.10
Greater wealth gives the society the wherewithal to solve
environmental problems, while private property ownership
and market forces offer incentives for individuals to
conserve resources. When coupled with an appropriate
liability system, property rights can also prevent individuals

102

Kimberly A. Strassel, It's Not So Green in the Dark, OpinionJournal (Feb. 8, 2001),

available at http://www.opinionjoumal.com/coluniists/kstrassel/?id=85000562 (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Cascade Policy Inst., Free Market Environmentalism, available at http://www.ca
scadepo licy.org/env.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
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and companies from damaging land and property they do
not own as well. 106
Market initiatives, such as pollution permits, allow private parties to patrol
the environment. What idealistic environmental lawyers often forget is
that progress has its price and that unless we, as a society, decide to live in
caves, we will have to manage natural resources. Dedicated lawyers can
best help the environment by encouraging their clients to engage in such a
cost-benefit analysis.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH-ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERING IS NOT
A ZERO-SUM GAME

II.

While the environmental groups have continued their absolutist
in front of the cameras,
traditional opposition to industry development
07
attitudes.1
of
change
a
their behavior suggests
The Audubon Society owns a 26,000-acre wildlife refuge
in Louisiana (the Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary), which
contains fish, shrimp, crab, deer, ducks and wading birds
and is visited by over 100,000 migrating snow geese each
year. The Rainey Sanctuary also contains reserves of
natural gas and oil that attracted commercial interest from
drilling companies when they were discovered in the
1940s. Since the Audubon Society owns the land, and the
mineral rights, it could have prevented drilling. Yet the
Audubon Society allowed 37 wells to pump gas and oil
from the Rainey Sanctuary in return for royalties that have
added more than $25 million to the Society's income. With
ownership came the motivation to consider the costs and
benefits of the decisions made. The Audubon Society

obviously considered the risks of drilling, but it also
carefully considered the benefits since those benefits were
reflected in wealth it could capture and use for such things
as buying additional sanctuaries and funding educational

106

Id.

107 Dwight R. Lee, Let Audubon Society Decide the Fate of Alaska's Arctic Refuge, (Oct.
19, 2000) available at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/102000/opi_102000003.s
html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
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programs. The Audubon Society obviously thought8 the
benefits from oil drilling were greater than the costs. 0
If the Audubon society and oil companies can deal in a mutually
beneficial manner, it is hard to believe than lawyers cannot also facilitate
an essential balance, sometimes with their own clients.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct clearly encourage
lawyers to act as intermediaries between their clients and the general
society. Rule 2.1 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation."' 10 9 The commentary to the Rule
continues: "Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may
decisively influence how the law will be applied."''t
Furthermore, the
clients might actually welcome such advice. Most clients do not want
their attorneys to advise them solely on the way to circumvent the law. '11
Due to an increasing demand for good corporate citizenship, corporations
are concerned with their public image. 1 2 The clients may actually value
their lawyer's political and moral judgments and view them as an essential
13
viewpoint that may not otherwise have been considered in a boardroom."
Unless one accepts the skeptical view that corporations are more
concerned with marketing a good corporate image than actually living up
to it, an environmentally-conscious lawyer should feel comfortable
expressing his own views on the topic as part of his balanced and candid
advice."14 Furthermore, the lawyers must realize that their clients' level of
compliance will in large part depend on their perception of an underlying
compliance culture.1 1 5 Lawyers might thus be encouraged to counsel their
clients to do the "right thing" (assuming that the lawyer and the client
agree, in general, on what the "right thing" is.) Finally, lawyers and
clients must realize that an environmental regime that consistently fails to
108

Id.

109 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R.

110 Id.at R. 2.1 cmt.

IIIWilliams, supra note 48, at 1072.
112

113
114

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2.1 (2001).
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deliver on its explicit and implicit promises because of a culture of
noncompliance among regulated parties is an open invitation for public
demands for more draconian governmental responses. 116
III.

CONCLUSION

This article poses more questions then it answers. That, however,
is the point of the discussion. Legal ethics do not tolerate formalistic
approaches, nor do they allow for self-congratulatory rhetoric. Lawyers
who feel passionately about the protection of the environment should
realize that by ignoring the interests of their clients, they are undermining
the very foundation of our legal system. The discussion about the merits
of the environmental regulations belongs in the legislatures and lobbying
groups. It belongs in a conversation between an attorney and his client as
they discuss the latter's options. However, it certainly does not belong in
the mind of an attorney as he contemplates the type of the advice he is
willing to offer his client. Practitioners who suffer from more acute crises
of conscience should consider work for regulatory agencies or as
prosecutors. Or, if they cannot resolve their moral dilemmas, they could
exercise their discretion and just refuse to represent a client whose
activities are inconsistent with their own beliefs.

116

Id. at 1073.

